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Few, if any, soldiers emerge from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
unchanged. For many—indeed, probably for most—the negatives 
outweigh the positives. While the views of individual veterans may 
change with the passage of time—mellowing for some, hardening for 
others—the public should seek out those who served while the troops’ 
experience is fresh and while they still struggle with its meaning.  
For policy-makers and a public that has remained largely 
disengaged during the wars, the troops’ experience offers an entry 
point into an overdue national conversation, one with significant 
implications for expectations of the military in coming years. U.S. 
policy less than fully informed by this experience will suffer 
accordingly. 
The experience of the veterans consulted in this research has a 
number of themes. Recurring positives include the performance of 
difficult tasks with a high degree of professionalism, the sense of 
cohesion among the troops, the expressed concern for civilian 
populations, and the greater sense of direction and commitment to 
country and community emerging from the experience. Recurring 
negatives include the lack of preparation for the carnage encountered, 
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widespread ambivalence among the troops about the wars and the 
troops’ mission, the erosion of soldiers’ sense of humanity, and the 
challenges of re-entry and rehabilitation. Positives and negatives are 
often intertwined. 
Positives 
Professionalism 
Most of the men and women deployed into the two principal 
theaters of the Global War on Terror were highly professional. They 
took absences from family and community in stride, even the 
involuntary “stop-loss” extensions of their tours designed to meet the 
military’s critical manpower needs. Some National Guard members 
who enlisted in advance of 9/11 with no thought of overseas 
deployment felt that the ground rules changed in mid-stream. Yet 
even they made necessary adjustments with a minimum of 
complaining. Not only the Guard but also other reserve personnel as 
well as active-duty troops uniformly honored their commitments 
when summoned.1 
The discipline exhibited by veterans who consistently placed a 
sense of duty above inconvenience and personal opinion was striking. 
“President Bush is my commander in chief,” said Lt. Col. Ralph Riley. 
“As long as I’m in the Army, whatever he says goes” (qtd. in Minear, 
Through 33; Riley 43537). “I’m part of the military and I believe in its 
ways,” said Lt. Ron Maloney. “Where else do you get a job that 
reinforces those types of values: personal integrity, personal courage, 
selflessness? Not too many bosses out there say, ‘Hey, these are the 
                                                 
1 For an elaboration of the experience of those serving in the National 
Guard, see Minear, U.S. Citizen Soldier 19-25. 
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key requirements for you to be in this job’” (qtd. in Minear, Through 
33).  
One crucial ingredient of military professionalism involves putting 
politics aside. Whatever their personal views about the two wars, most 
veterans took their responsibility as soldiers with great seriousness. 
Not that the troops were without political views. Letters and blogs 
from the two 9/11 theaters confirm that politics regularly heated up 
the atmosphere in billets and bunkhouses. “I always find it amusing 
when people talk about the ‘military’ vote,” wrote Sgt. Sharon Allen, a 
diesel fuel tanker driver in Iraq. “Tempers can get heated and on some 
days it probably isn’t a good idea that we are all armed” (qtd. in 
Minear, Through 33). Yet deeply held personal views on the politics 
and policies of the wars did not, by most accounts, impede the 
performance of duties. 
The troops’ commitment to each other dwarfed personal 
reservations about the strategies and tactics employed by their 
superiors. “There are quiet professionals wherever you go,” said a 
female West Point graduate who, during the course of 15 months in 
Iraq, flew her Black Hawk helicopter in more than 200 hours of 
combat (Hough 10). “I can honestly say,” reflected one Army officer 
who commanded an eight-man infantry squad in Iraq in 2005–06, 
“that I never once supported the cause” of freedom, the stated 
rationale for the U.S. military presence. “The only thing I supported 
was the commitment I had made to my fellow soldiers. When it comes 
to your capacity to take responsibility for your men, it is a moot point 
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whether or not you are a conscientious objector.”2 Others, too, took 
care not to let personal opinions undercut their performance. 
Despite the manifold challenges, veterans downplayed the 
difficulty of their tasks. Their constant refrain was, “What I did was 
not heroic. I was simply doing my job.” In fact, many expressed 
discomfort with the lavish thanks for their service received from total 
strangers in airports and at sporting events. Of course, such 
receptions were a pleasant contrast to those given troops returning 
from Vietnam. Indeed, the warmth of the receptions was a gratifying 
indication that, post-Vietnam, Americans now separate the warriors 
from the wars.  
Yet some veterans also found themselves wondering whether their 
well-wishers had any real clue about what their “service to the nation” 
may have involved. Reflecting on the reception following his Army 
tour in Iraq, Sean Casey was unnerved by the public’s increasingly 
routine “celebration of his violent profession.” If the strangers who 
professed gratitude knew more about the actual soldiering, he mused, 
they would be less effusive in their praise. He shares his uneasiness in 
his writings, he said, because doing so helps bring “order to the 
internal chaos,” he feels (33). 
Other soldiers were even more explicit in rejecting the hero label. 
“WE ARE NOT YOUR HEROES,” writes Jennifer Pacanowski, an 
Army combat medic from Iraq, in words that scream from the written 
page. “We are your BURDEN, smacking you in the face with our 
honesty of this needless war. I wish I never came back” (151). A small 
                                                 
2 Interviewed by the author, this veteran requested anonymity. 
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number of veterans, willing volunteers at the outset, sought formal 
recognition and honorable discharges as conscientious objectors.3 
 
Cohesion 
A second theme emerging from the research is the high degree of 
commitment among the troops toward each other. All who served did 
so by their own choice. Conscription ended in 1973 following the 
Vietnam War, and all who fought in the Global War on Terror did so 
voluntarily. Like it or not, observed Navy Commander (now U.S. 
Senator from Illinois) Mark Kirk, “We all signed up for this” (Minear, 
Through 166; Kirk 38582). 
The major incentives for enlistees were economic (the doldrums of 
a slack economy, especially in rural areas) and educational (the desire 
to earn degrees during and after service). Some enlisted out of a sense 
of patriotism, seeking recruiters in large numbers especially in the 
days immediately following the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers and 
the Pentagon. But many in the ranks found the concept of a “Global 
War on Terror,” the official rationale for Operation Enduring Freedom 
(the Afghanistan campaign) and Operation Iraqi Freedom, something 
of a stretch.4 
The palpable solidarity among the troops also reflected a 
camaraderie born of shared hardships. Robert D’Amico, a Marine Lt. 
                                                 
3 The experience and treatment of conscientious objectors are the 
subject of a separate article by the author: Larry Minear, “Conscience 
and U.S. Military Service: The Uneasy Fit in Afghanistan and Iraq,” 
Journal of Military Ethics (2014, forthcoming). 
 
4 For the views of National Guard personnel on this point, see Minear, 
U.S. Citizen Soldier 39–43. 
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Colonel who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq, observed that the 
experience of “sharing bad times with good people . . . has a tendency 
to bond you for the rest of your life” (Minear, Through 166; D’Amico 
62471). “You know you miss your family but you’re with another 
family,” added Air Force Colonel William Andrews. “The squadron 
you’re part of kind of takes on a family atmosphere of its own” 
(Minear, Through 144; Andrews 42880). Army 1st Lt. Trevor Bradna 
noted that in the circumstances, his fellow troops were his “only 
source of support and entertainment” (Minear, Through 144; Bradna 
47553). 
The depth of commitment to each other is reflected in the distress 
felt by many who returned to the States for medical or family reasons 
while their units remained in the field or who, following their units’ 
rotation back home, did not return with their units to the field. The 
bonds of those who shared common risks and entrusted their lives to 
each other often overrode even very deep-seated views related to 
gender and race. Such solidarity also existed despite the recurring 
pattern of rampant sexual abuse, often of lower-ranking women by 
their superiors, which became a major concern for Congress and the 
military in 2013. Such strong bonds influenced many veterans’ 
decision to re-up, irrespective of the reality that another deployment 
would place them once again in harm’s way and would force another 
round of difficult adjustments for their families on the home front.  
 
Concern for Local Civilians 
A third recurring positive is the troops’ widely expressed concern 
for local civilians. Many soldiers were taken aback by the wretched 
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situation of ordinary Afghans and Iraqis and sought ways of reaching 
out to them. In actuality, however, their daily contacts with civilians 
were strictly circumscribed by security concerns. “We were segregated 
from the local population,” observed Sgt. Ben Flanders. (Minear, 
Through 61). “It would have been nice,” commented Capt. Ralan Hill, 
“to have a little more interaction” with the locals beyond those 
employed as translators and laborers on military bases (Minear, 
Through 61; Hill 43145). Few Americans spoke local languages or had 
local friends. 
The most satisfying aspect of the experience for many involved 
assisting those who lived near military bases with textbooks and 
soccer balls, vaccinations, and jobs. Friends and family in the States 
donated many items, an activity that gave them a sense of 
participation in the war effort. U.S. military officials viewed “civic 
action” programs as helpful in generating sympathy for U.S. military 
presence. They were also seen as providing reasonably safe tasks for 
the females in the ranks, although many women—far more than was 
generally perceived or acknowledged—were themselves exposed to 
combat. 
Sgt. Stephanie Corcoran, who served in Iraq with a military police 
unit from Fort Benning, Georgia, expressed in e-mails to family and 
friends how much she learned in her travels “outside the wire” about 
the Iraqi way of life and about the blessings she took for granted back 
home (Minear, Through 61-62). In Afghanistan, one officer described 
his informal evening meetings with tribal elders as the highlight of his 
entire deployment. 
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Humane activities and sentiments notwithstanding, there were 
strict limits to such interactions. As the troops pointed out, their aid 
programs were geared to winning hearts and minds; programs which 
did not succeed were sooner or later reduced or terminated. Other 
programs fell into disrepair when the troops withdrew or were 
destroyed by the soldiers themselves upon their departure so as to not 
benefit the insurgency.5 
Sgt. Corcoran herself found that “everything over here has an 
invisible ‘approach with caution’ sign on it.” Interactions with local 
populations were understandably monitored closely, she observed, to 
avoid compromising unit security. She also identified as “the most 
disappointing part” of her deployment the “hate toward the people of 
Iraq” expressed by members of the U.S. military. The soldier who 
slipped away for informal evening get-togethers with local Afghan 
elders was AWOL, he acknowledged, whenever he did so. 
 
An Opening to the Future 
A fourth positive theme is the impact of the experience on the 
attitudes and worldviews of the troops. Many returned home with a 
strong sense of accomplishment. “I wear my uniform proudly,” said 
Sr. Amn. Patrick J. McGonigle III. “I wear it every once and a while 
just to wear it and say, ‘Hey, I earned this’” (Minear, Through 25; 
McGonigle 48161). For some who had neither a clear sense of 
direction nor articulated values prior to joining the ranks, military 
service gave them something to build upon. “I was living a little bit of 
a crazy lifestyle,” recalled a veteran, “and wanted to get things 
                                                 
5 For additional examples, see Minear, U.S. Citizen Soldier 92-96. 
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together—basically to get my head straight.” Building on his wartime 
experiences, he was able to identify a career path and apply himself 
with new-found energy and determination.  
One woman with a son in the Vermont National Guard spoke 
emotionally about positive changes she had witnessed. Before his unit 
was called up, he had been an indifferent student and a real loner. 
Returning from the fray, he showed new interest in family history and 
participated in community affairs and the celebration of national 
holidays.6 The recruiters’ best friend often turned out to be the 
recruit’s parents (frequently the fathers) of young men who told their 
offspring in no uncertain terms to get out of the house and do 
something useful for a change. 
Spec. Philip Wade Geiger credited his military service with making 
him a better person. “It has made me more respectful and more 
socially conscious. . . . Before I enlisted, I didn’t care about any world 
events or news. This keeps my eyes open now because I’m interested 
in things that are evolving that could involve me or friends of mine” 
(Minear, Through 22; Geiger 30333). His military commitment 
fulfilled and back in civilian life, one officer jumped at the chance of 
returning to the Middle East for a year as a teacher. “Having gone to 
fight against people I didn’t know anything about,” he explained, “I 
wanted to see the culture through a different lens.”7 
Sgt. Mathew Sean Neely described his time in an infantry division 
in Iraq as “a life-changing experience for sure. I view life a lot 
                                                 
6 Comments by the participants in a focus group at the National Guard 
Armory in Bradford, VT, on 13 Nov. 2006 were not for attribution.  
7 Name withheld at the request of the interviewee. 
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differently. I have a better handle on things” (Minear, Through 22; 
Neely 29104). Marine Lt. Cpl. Brian Aria is thankful simply for having 
survived: “I appreciate things every day now” (Minear, Through 22; 
Aria 50547). 
Spec. Jennifer Schwab, who signed up with the New Hampshire 
National Guard while still in high school, used her combat bonus to 
underwrite college tuition costs. From her base in Afghanistan, she 
took distance-learning courses, completing her degree upon returning. 
She parlayed her experience with the Guard into work in journalism 
and with NGOs (Minear, Through 21). Others developed the skills 
acquired overseas, moving up career ladders or into new careers 
altogether. Many completing military service were still in their 
twenties, giving them ample time to build on their experiences. And of 
course some re-upped and pursued careers within the military. 
But the experiences described in interviews and journals were by 
no means uniformly positive. One soldier who faithfully kept a diary 
destroyed it before returning home to avoid keeping open a chapter in 
his life he preferred to forget. Another turned down invitations to join 
veterans’ organizations in his desire to put the whole experience 
behind him as quickly as possible. He had paid enough already, he 
said, and had no desire to commit to annual dues. Others found 
homes in veterans’ organizations, traditional ones such as the 
American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars that, broadly 
speaking, have championed the 9/11 wars as well as newer-breed 
groups with an anti-war persuasion, such as Iraq Veterans Against the 
War. 
 
135 
 
Negatives 
Rampant Carnage 
From the early days, soldiers were stunned by levels of carnage 
exceeding anything they had experienced or expected. They 
confronted carnage both in its narrow definition as “the flesh of slain 
animals or men” and in its wider sense of “the great destruction of life, 
as in battle.” Reflecting on his time in Iraq, where he did medical 
evacuations by helicopter, Sgt. Matthew Miller was struck by how 
greatly his day-to-day duties differed from his work as a paramedic in 
Maryland. “At home, it’s car crashes, but their body parts are still on 
them,” he explained. “Here there is so much blood and pieces of bone 
missing. We have sprayed our aircraft and found pieces of bone” 
(Minear, Through 57). 
Sgt. Steve Pink reported a searing experience: shaking a man’s 
hand that was no longer attached at the arm. It was “dangling from 
the exposed bone that used to be his elbow,” he recalled, “like a child’s 
safety-clipped mitten dangling from their winter coat” (Minear, 
Through 56-57). Having encountered violence at close range, and with 
such images indelibly etched on their minds, almost half of the 2.5 
million veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq are seeking compensation 
for injuries they sustained, many of them psychological. 
The sheer brutality of the conflicts has taken a heavy toll. In a 
deposition on the factors that contributed to the suicide of a man in 
his unit, one officer explained to the court that many troops “weren’t 
prepared for what they saw.” One of the most unsettling practices of 
the Iraqi enemy, he said, involved sending “children out to blow up 
truck convoys.” The troops’ rules of engagement stipulated that “when 
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the children were seen in the road, the soldiers were told to actually 
keep going and run right over them . . . because if they stopped for the 
children, as would be the norm, there was a possibility that these 
children could be armed or wired with explosives” (Minear, Through 
81–82).The moral ambiguities were excruciating. In situations already 
fraught with insecurity and tension, soldiers had to make life-and-
death judgments quickly. “If you’re looking at a kid on the side of the 
road with something in his hand,” observed one analyst, “if it’s a 
grenade and he throws it and kills someone in your unit, you’ve failed 
your comrade. But if it’s a rock, you’ve just shot a kid with a rock.”8 
The Army conducted a survey in 2003 to pinpoint the intensity 
and pervasiveness of the violence soldiers were experiencing. Of the 
2,856 troops polled, 39 percent of those serving in Afghanistan had 
seen dead bodies or human remains; in Iraq, 95 percent. Thirty and 
65 percent respectively had seen dead or seriously injured Americans; 
46 and 69 percent had seen injured women or children whom they 
had been unable to help. Twelve and 48 percent reported having killed 
an enemy combatant. U.S. troops were surrounded and inundated by 
violence (Hoge et al. 18). Even the Green Zone in Baghdad, a “safe” 
area from which to conduct diplomatic and military activities, offered 
no enduring refuge. 
The mayhem that many soldiers witnessed caused what mental 
health professionals within and outside the government have come to 
call “moral injury.” It is defined as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, 
                                                 
8 Rita Nakashima Brock, quoted in Freedman (n. pag.). Brock is 
founding co-director of the Soul Repair Center at Brite Divinity 
School, Texas Christian University. 
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bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held 
moral beliefs and expectations.”9 The affected individual feels that he 
or she has violated core individual or organizational values and 
norms. The ferocity of the carnage and the destabilizing effects of the 
accompanying moral injury help explain why some veterans have had 
great difficulty reconnecting with their families. Preparing for the 
return from Iraq of her husband, Army Sgt. Charles M. King, Dana 
Canedy mused, “What he had seen and done over there I could not 
imagine. But there was clearly no way to emerge from a world in 
which you are routinely involved in taking and saving lives and not be 
transformed” (189). 
Some soldiers changed to such a degree—or had been away for so 
long—that their own children no longer recognized them. Long-
awaited airport reunions were transformed from events of anticipated 
joy to encounters of excruciating pain. Meeting him on one of his 
arrivals home after an extended deployment, one of the children of Lt. 
Col. D’Amico did not recognize him and refused to speak to him for a 
week (Minear, Through 129; D’Amico 62471). 
A once mild-mannered veteran who returned to rural Vermont 
from Afghanistan had such an “attitude,” his wife recalled, that she 
did not dare leave him at home alone with their children. Army 
Specialist Gonzalo Gonzales went to great lengths to arrange 
employment in a school. “It really helped me out,” he said, “just being 
around children” (Minear, Through 139; Gonzales 60176). Some 
veterans were reluctant to tell their children about their war 
                                                 
9 The definition is from Litz, et al. as quoted in Litz and Maguen (4).  
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experiences or even to share details with interviewers except under 
strictest guarantees of confidentiality. Some were non-committal 
when asked whether they would encourage their own children to seek 
careers in the military. Others planned to try to dissuade them when 
the time came. 
 
Mission Ambivalence  
The level and intensity of the carnage were connected to a second 
theme on the negative side of the ledger: reservations among veterans 
about their mission and their accomplishments. Many found the 
declaration of war against Afghanistan in September 2001 an 
appropriate response to the 9/11 attack and to the country harboring 
its mastermind, Osama bin Laden. However, the expansion of the 
Global War on Terror in March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq was far 
less widely supported. The invasion seemed only remotely connected 
to U.S. interests and lacked the international imprimatur given for the 
Afghanistan war. Failure to discover weapons of mass destruction, the 
stated rationale for invading Iraq and deposing its leader, further 
fueled doubts. 
The views of individual veterans of the conflicts and the carnage 
did not follow predictable patterns. Some who at the time of 
deployment had serious misgivings became convinced of the rightness 
of the wars. “Everybody goes through a cycle,” observed Staff Sgt. E-6 
Bradley Burd. “After two months on the ground in Iraq, soldiers doubt 
the mission of the troops. After four months they’re unsure. And by six 
months they’re absolutely persuaded of its importance” (Minear, 
Through 36; Burd 30269).Others who started out with great 
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enthusiasm became less sure over time. “I was pretty gung-ho at first,” 
recalled Army Sgt. Greg Mayfield. “But now,” he said, after months of 
intense combat in Iraq, “I question a lot of policies and the politics of 
it. I mean, you just don’t go to war for any damned reason. You’d 
better have a good reason to do it, because it is so damaging” (Minear, 
Through 37; Mayfield 60193). 
Thinking back to the time of his deployment to Afghanistan, a 
disillusioned Sgt. Mike Moriarty recalled, “I supported the mission. 
But [now] I’m starting to say to myself, ‘What the fuck?’ If the 
problem isn’t going away, then kick it up a notch. And I don’t give a 
fuck if that means nuking this whole fucking country. Meanwhile, 
there are fucking innocent fucking U.S. soldiers getting killed” 
(Minear, Through 67).Indicating how a soldier’s views may change 
over time, Marine Thomas Gibbons-Neff found himself reassessing his 
own role after the bombing of the Boston Marathon in April 2013: “I 
deployed to Afghanistan believing that my presence in that country 
would help stop attacks such as Boston’s from happening. But instead, 
my war has spilled over. I wonder,” he mused, “have America’s wars 
made the homeland less safe?” Boston was the hometown of Gibbons-
Neff and his parents.  
 
Erosion of Humanity 
A third recurrent theme involves the challenge of retaining, under 
the duress of combat, a sense of humanity, both among the troops 
themselves and in relation to their adversaries. Maintaining familiar 
pastimes and routines became important, however the circumstances 
in theater changed. Marine Lt. Col. Robert D’Amico, deployed twice to 
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Afghanistan and seven times to Iraq, helped his daughter Becky Ann 
with her homework via nightly Skype connections—he in his unit’s 
telecommunications room, she at the family’s kitchen table (Minear, 
Through 115; D’Amico 62471). Being connected on a daily basis with 
family was the next-best thing to being there in person. 
Daily postings of bird sightings kept Sgt. 1st Class Jonathan 
Trouern-Trend in touch with family and friends back in Connecticut. 
“The birds gave me both the excitement of the new and exotic and the 
anchor of the familiar,” he wrote in Birding in Babylon. “I hope to 
return to Iraq one day, armed only with binoculars and a camera” 
(Minear, Through 59-60; Trouern-Trend 11-12). A woman in the 
Vermont National Guardwould recover a sense of equanimity by 
listening to a cassette tape with sounds of her favorite trails in the 
White Mountains. 
Some veterans came to view respect for the humanity of Afghans 
and Iraqis as an investment in keeping their own humanity intact. In a 
2003 letter to his son and his cohorts in Iraq, Vietnam veteran Stan 
Goff offered an impassioned warning, based on his own Indochina 
experience. “When you take away the humanity of another,” he wrote, 
“you kill your own humanity. Do whatever you have to do to survive, 
however you define survival. But don’t surrender your humanity” 
(Minear, Through 139). 
Mario Figueroa, a Marine deployed to Iraq, was prepared to pull 
the trigger if necessary. “However, I was constantly in fear,” he 
recalled, that if he did so, “my humanity would be consumed, and that 
I would be turned into the broken shell of a man similar to those 
dejected soldiers that had returned from Vietnam.” He recounted an 
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instance when, by delaying firing, he was spared the need to shoot two 
Iraqis. “I would eventually kill another man,” he concluded, referring 
to a later incident. “It was everything I feared it to be. I still 
maintained my idealism and my empathy for life, but I was one of the 
lucky ones” (Warrior Writers 87–88).  
Figueroa’s comment recalls the observation by Lt. Col. Dave 
Grossman that “Killing another person, even in combat, is difficult as 
it is fundamentally against our nature and the innate guiding compass 
within most human beings.” In On Combat: The Psychology and 
Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace, Grossman wrote, 
“In combat, warriors must psychologically distance themselves from 
the humanity of their opponent … The adversary becomes a target or 
an objective or any number of derogatory epithets that separates 
‘them from us’” (341). 
Based on work with veterans suffering from PTSD, psychiatrist 
Jonathan Shay sounds a cautionary note. Rather than denigrating 
soldiers’ adversaries as subhuman species who “don’t value human life 
like we do,” the enemy should be understood to be dangerous 
“because they are human just like us” (Shay 203).The humanity of the 
enemy is the subject of “Turntables,” a poem by Nate Lewis, who 
deployed with his Army unit to Iraq in 2003:  
 
 If things were the other way around 
20-year-old Iraqi soldiers would write home to  
girlfriends about the cold New York winter… 
A captain would stand under a tall pine in Appalachia and call  
home to Baghdad on a satellite phone. . .  
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Children would scribble the number and type of every enemy  
 vehicle in Crayon . . .  
Iraqi veterans return to Mosques, classrooms  
and Parliament to speak about the murder and destruction. 
The war crimes. (Lewis 15–16). 
 
The international rules of warfare seek to affirm and protect the 
humanity of the warring parties in their treatment of each other. Sgt. 
John McCary, an intelligence officer with an infantry division in Iraq’s 
Anbar province in 2004, affirms this importance. In an anguished e-
mail to his family in North Carolina, he asked, “What do you say to 
your men after you’ve scraped up the scalps of an entire Iraqi family 
off the road, right next to the shattered bodies of your soldiers, held 
together only by their shoelaces, body armor or helmets? ‘We’re 
fighting the good fight’? I don’t think so. We’re just fighting. And now 
we’re dying.” Despite the brutality of the struggle, McCary concluded, 
“We will be harsh and strict, but not unjust, and we will not give up. 
We cannot. Our lives are tied to those lost, and we cannot leave them 
now” (Minear, Through 73-74). 
Yet the framework for professional military conduct in both 9/11 
theaters was neither clear nor binding. Veterans’ experience suggests 
that the legal framework has had at best an uneven impact on the 
conduct of military operations—in some instance, little discernible 
influence at all. Soldiers acknowledged receiving training in the 
international rules of warfare, carrying plastic cards that reminded 
them of the “soldier’s rules.” However, given the confused situation on 
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the ground and flagrant and repeated violations by the enemy, the 
international rules may have been honored largely in the breach.  
Patrick Resta recalled an exchange with the commander of his 
infantry platoon, a unit tasked with running a small prison camp in 
Jalula, Iraq. “The Geneva Conventions don’t exist at all in Iraq,” he 
remembers being told, “and that’s in writing if you want to see it” 
(Minear, Through 77-78). The rules of engagement (ROE), the legal 
framework established to govern the conduct of military operations in 
specified locations, often seemed unclear to the rank and file. “We 
changed the ROEs more often than we changed our underwear,” 
commented Adam Kokesh.10 
In the wake of the international furor unleashed by the 2004 
revelation of abuses by U.S. personnel in Abu Ghraib prison, the 
military held crash briefings on the Geneva Conventions. However, 
the climate was not particularly receptive. An Army survey in Iraq in 
2006 confirmed that about one third of those interviewed felt that 
torture of prisoners should be allowed if it helped gather important 
information about insurgents. Four in ten would support torture if it 
saved the life of a fellow soldier. “Less than half of soldiers and 
Marines,” the report found, “believed that non-combatants should be 
treated with dignity and respect.” About 10 percent of those surveyed 
reported having mistreated civilians in Iraq. Senior Pentagon officials 
conceded that the report’s findings were “not always easy to look at” 
(Minear, Through 71-72).  
                                                 
10 For additional examples, see testimony by a dozen soldiers in the 
section on rules of engagement in the study by Iraq Veterans Against 
the War and Glantz: Winter Soldier (13-54). 
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Some soldiers were critical of how their cohorts breached the rules 
of combat and mistreated captured prisoners, in effect steeling the 
enemy’s resolve to fight. Some challenged the view expressed by 
General Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 
2001-05, that “the Geneva Conventions were part of our military 
culture and every military member was trained on them.” General 
Myers held that the United States represented the “gold standard” 
among the world’s militaries in adherence to the principles of 
international humanitarian law (203). Others agreed instead with 
clinical psychologist Kathleen Dahlstedt that “military training does 
not prepare troops for the inherent moral and ethical dilemmas that 
war poses” (n. pag.). 
 
Re-entry and Rehabilitation 
“The toughest part of fighting a war is coming home,” observes 
Army Capt. Andrew Michael Wells in identifying the fourth and final 
negative theme. “People want to know everything you experienced, 
but they don’t really want to understand—and can’t possibly 
understand.” As patriotic fervor wanes and as people lose interest, 
Wells found that he appreciates the simple thank-you more than the 
occasional probing question (Minear, Through 131; Wells 54819). 
Randi Moriarty, wife of Sgt. Mike Moriarty, took a dim view of how 
much could be shared, even between spouses firmly committed to 
each other. “He so badly wants me to understand what he went 
through,” she said. “I will never understand, just as he will never 
understand what I went through” (Minear, Through 130). 
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Beyond the struggles of communicating at the individual and 
family levels are problems that institutions have identifying and 
responding to needs of returning veterans. New Hampshire offers a 
microcosm of the problems faced by the country as a whole.  
Of the roughly 800 soldiers in its National Guard unit who returned 
from Iraq in early 2005, officials discovered an array of needs. Some 
48 soldiers required immediate assistance, 398 requested a follow-up 
phone call during the first month of their return, and 84 others sought 
help during the first year. In all, some 530 of the 800 soldiers availed 
themselves of mental health services at one point or another. New 
Hampshire’s insistence on one-on-one debriefings of returning troops 
(despite pressure from military leaders and local families for the 
quickest possible reunions) became something of a model, as did its 
promotion of cooperation between the public and private sectors in 
assisting veterans (Minear, Through 151-153). 
Such alarming data lends credibility to the assessment by Matthew 
J. Friedman. “The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said in 2006, “are 
likely to produce a new generation of veterans with chronic mental 
health problems associated with participation in combat.” Head of the 
network of post-traumatic stress disorder centers run by the VA, 
Friedman has concluded that “Most people who have survived this 
experience will be changed by it, whether crossing some psychiatric 
threshold or not” (Minear, Through 159). 
In fact, the nation’s public and private social service institutions 
have been struggling to cope with the need. An independent study 
released in early 2013 of the problems of veterans returning to the 
U.S. more than a decade into both conflicts found a backlog of more 
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than 600,000 claims: “The average wait to begin receiving disability 
compensation and other benefits is 273 days, and up to 327 days for 
veterans making claims for the first time” (“The Grim” n. pag.). By 
then, the number of veterans’ lives lost by suicide exceeded the 
number killed in action in the two theaters. In 2013, the VA 
committed itself to eliminating the backlog of unprocessed disability 
claims by the end of 2015, two full years into the future (“2013”).  
The return of veterans has focused attention on the costs of the 
two wars: direct and indirect, immediate and longer-term, individual 
and institutional, economic and social. Of the 2.5 million U.S. troops 
who have served in the two theaters, the Defense Department reports 
that as of September 4, 2013, the number of military personnel killed 
in action (KIA) in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) as 
2,265, with 19,250 wounded in action (WIA). For Iraq, military deaths 
associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and its successor, Operation 
New Dawn, are reported at 4,476 KIA, with 32,230 WIA (U.S. 1). 
Economist Linda Bilmes estimates the eventual cost of both wars 
at $4 to $6 trillion, much of it yet to be paid. Rehabilitation costs, 
including treatment for the projected lifetimes of the wounded, 
represent a significant portion of that sum (Yglesias n. pag.). 
 
Implications 
The voices of veterans in this article and in the primary sources on 
which it is based deserve to be heard and pondered. The experience of 
veterans is irreplaceable, their perspective indispensable. As Marine 
Sgt. Dax Carpenter, who returned from tours in Afghanistan and Iraq 
with both PTSD and Traumatic Brain Injury, explained, “History is 
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written by man. But the person that does the writing wasn’t there” 
(Minear, Through130; Carpenter 57035). Carpenter has paid his dues 
and, like other boots on the ground, knows whereof he speaks. 
Veterans of the 9/11 conflicts are in a unique position to keep 
elected officials and the public, historians, and social science 
researchers honest. The nation’s reliance on an all-volunteer army 
puts a premium on addressing the negative aspects of recent 
experience in the interest of attracting men and women into the ranks. 
The wider array of veterans’ groups existing today and their more 
variegated participation in the public policy process requires greater 
attention to their views. The reluctance of some from the 9/11 theaters 
to recommend military service to their own sons and daughters—in 
some instances, even actively seeking to dissuade them from 
enlisting—should serve as a warning flag. 
Such a “ground-truthing” role, a recurring function played by 
American boots on the ground in every war, is particularly essential 
for the two 9/11 conflicts. The public’s lack of engagement with the 
issues of the wars lends urgency to launching a serious dialogue 
regarding the true costs of the conflicts. Indeed, as soldiers ponder 
their own experience, the American public has an opportunity to reach 
its own conclusions about the validity and value of what has been 
done in its name. Two issues stand out with particular clarity from the 
experience of U.S. troops. 
First, what should trigger future deployment of U.S. military 
forces? The question has special urgency given the widespread 
reservations in the ranks about the legitimacy of the war against 
Iraq—a “war of choice”—which were not shared about the war against 
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Afghanistan—a “war of necessity.” Yet even that distinction needs 
examination. However provocative the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. had 
choices in how it responded, only one of which involved declaring war 
and putting hundreds of thousands of boots on the ground in 
Afghanistan. The grinding war that followed also involved choices of 
its own. 
It would be an oversimplification to conclude that most U.S. 
military personnel returned with jaded views about America’s 
engagement in these two wars, or in all wars. As noted earlier, some 
veterans overcame initial doubts and became persuaded of the merits 
of one or both engagements. Some personal balance sheets came out 
clearly on the positive side of the ledger. A number of veterans 
maintained that however negative their own personal experience, the 
nation as a whole was well served by these wars. 
The jury will remain out for some time on U.S. engagement, 
strategy, and tactics in the Global War on Terror. Yet, even veterans 
who affirm the effectiveness of Operations Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom are more circumspect about what should trigger 
military action in future crises and what the U.S. military, once 
deployed, should expect to accomplish. After fighting for more than a 
decade in each conflict, the U.S. should review whether the choices 
made were the most effective and cost-effective in the circumstances.  
A second issue involves the commitment of this nation to those 
who serve in its military, both in the theaters of battle and after 
returning home. Many veterans believe that the nation did not meet 
its responsibility for equipping and training its military forces or for 
addressing their needs afterwards. A concern for protecting the 
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humanity and the well-being of its troops should give added weight to 
the notion─less radical than it might first seem─that the United States 
should not launch new military action unless it can provide adequately 
for the safety of its troops in the field and for their expected needs 
upon returning. That condition alone would put the military on a 
shorter leash and give greater weight to non-military alternatives. 
At this writing in the fall of 2013, some are clamoring for more 
“robust” involvement of the United States and its military forces in the 
crisis in Syria. They are doing so largely without acknowledging the 
experience and views of American combatants in the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq such as those chronicled in this article. Indeed, 
the debate on whether to launch a military strike against Syria in the 
wake of the use of chemical weapons by the regime of President 
Bashar al-Assad has morphed into a mini-referendum on the 
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. The strongest and most authentic 
cautionary notes in the debate have been sounded by veterans 
themselves. In its Statement against Military Force in Syria, Iraqi 
Veterans Against the War (IVAW) agrees with the Obama 
Administration, “The use of chemical weapons in Syria represents a 
‘moral obscenity.’” At the same time, IVAW asserts, “We believe that 
U.S. military action in Syria is also obscene. We condemn the use of 
chemical weapons, not only against civilians, but against all peoples in 
all nations.” The IVAW statement recalls that “In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, we were party to America’s introduction of white 
phosphorus and depleted uranium and know all too well their 
disastrous legacy on the people of those countries. We continue to 
watch our veteran brothers and sisters die of cancer from exposure to 
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these and other substances employed on the battlefield . . . We 
implore our leaders not to follow the mistakes that led to the Iraq war 
by violating national and international legal conventions” (n. pag.). 
While veterans are not in a position to craft U.S. policy, their 
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq offers a point of entry into a more 
realistic discussion of the challenges framed by Syria and other such 
conflicts in the future. Their experience illuminates complexities that 
policy makers and the public often obscure. Veterans can be expected 
to insist on more realistic objectives and more workable rules of 
engagement. They may deflate the messianism that often accompanies 
the contemplation and dispatch of U.S. troops.  
Surely it would be difficult both to honor the diverse experience of 
U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq and, at the same time, 
to proceed unchastened into another conflict, however irresistible the 
provocation, however different the particulars, and however 
compelling the morality of engagement. 
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